How can weaker states influence stronger ones? This article offers a case study of one recent exercise in coalition building among Southern middle powers, the 'India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum'. The analysis outlines five major points: first, it argues that the three emerging players can be defined as middle powers in order to frame their foreign policy behavior and options at the global level. Second, soft balancing is a suitable concept to explain IBSA's strategy in global institutions. Third, institutional foreign policy instruments are of pivotal significance in IBSA's soft balancing strategy.
rica was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2007 -2008 for the first time. In sum, this cursory glance at IBSA's tight schedule highlights the strengthening of diplomatic ties between the three emerging Southern powers over the last few years.
Together, India, Brazil and South Africa lobby for a reform of the United Nations that allows for a stronger role of developing countries, the majority of the UN member states. Nevertheless, the troika is not envisaging an alternative world order that privileges the developing world. Its initiative is instead firmly located in the existing international order, as the Brasilia Declaration 3 suggests:
'Respecting the rule of international law, strengthening the United Nations and the Security Council and prioritizing the exercise of diplomacy as means to maintain international peace and security.'
While the IBSA initiative may thus be seen as an effort to increase the bargaining power of developing nations, the cooperation between South Africa, India and Brazil equally focuses on concrete collaboration areas. Trade, energy security and transport are only the most prominent issues of IBSA's sector collaboration. IBSA can therefore be characterized as both a strategic alliance for the pursuit of common interests of developing countries in global institutions but also as a platform for bi-, trilateral and interregional South-South cooperation.
The sector cooperation shall form the sound base for trilateral diplomacy in world affairs.
This paper highlights the common interests and foreign policy instruments employed by India, Brazil and South Africa in global governance institutions without neglecting the pillar of sector cooperation. It argues that the coalition of emerging middle powers pursues its interests predominantly by means of institutional foreign policy instruments. In the long run IBSA's soft balancing strategy aims at halting the lack of representation of the developing world in global governance.
In order to locate the three emerging players in the international system and frame their foreign policy options, the first section examines their middle power features. The second sec- 
Patterns of emerging middle powers' foreign policies
States playing an international leading role in the sense of rule making are given special importance when the treatment of transnational problems is concerned. This applies to questions of world trade as well as to transnational security risks. Attempts to solve problems in these policies can be organized on the regional and global level. In both cases some state actors play a more important role than others in the course of cooperation and negotiation processes and have therefore more influence on the results. The reason can be the greater military or economic potential of these actors. In the same way their legitimacy, diplomatic effectiveness, moral authority as well as their representative function for a region or group of states might generate advantages in international bargaining.
India, Brazil and South Africa can be defined as regional powers, which emphasizes their predominance in geographically restricted areas and their role as regional peacemakers (Wright, 1978: 63; Østerud, 1992: 12; Huntington, 1999: 36) . Regional cooperation processes such as SAARC 4 , Mercosur 5 and SADC 6 can, on the one hand, serve as power bases for their largest members to project power in world affairs. Yet, on the other hand regional dynamics also limit the leaders' foreign policy options, as secondary regional players try to constrain the rising powers by refusing to grant them the necessary acceptance and legitimacy. (Hurrell, 2006) , and middle powers (Bischoff, 2003; Schoeman 2003; Ryerson and Dewitt, 2006) in order to capture their emerging status at the global level. Different attributes have been ascribed to middle powers. Some authors defined them by means of power resources such as their military capabilities (Wright, 1978: 65) , or their demographic and economic base (Kelly, 2004) . Although the economic potential of emerging powers (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003) and India's status as a nuclear power must be taken into consideration, material power resources take a back seat when it comes to bargains in global affairs. India, Brazil and South Africa limit the employment of material capabilities to their regions, as they are aware that they still cannot compete with the established great powers.
Most scholars have accepted a definition of middle powers that is based on their international behavior rather than on their material power. According to the behavioral definition, middle powers engage in middlepowermanship:
'[…] the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide diplomacy' (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993: 19) .
In effect, the category of middle powers is more promising to explain common patterns of foreign policy strategies and behavior of the IBSA countries than to compare their material capabilities. Middle power is a term used in the discipline of International Relations to describe states that do not have great power status, but that nevertheless have international influence. Keohane (1969: 298) defines middle powers as states whose leaders consider that they cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution. Cox (1996: 245) notes that middle powers had no special place in regional blocs during the cold war period, but they were closely linked to international organization as a process. According to Cox, a middle power supports the process of international organization because of its interests in a stable and orderly environment, rather than to seek to impose an ideologically preconceived vision of an ideal world order. By implication, therefore, a middle power is one active in international organizations and supports the objectives of international peace and security, as one of its defined national interests, which leads to a more stable world order. Accordingly middle powers' foreign policy objectives overlap with the 'civilian ends' (Duchêne, 1973; Maull, 1990) of foreign policy, defined as international cooperation, solidarity, domestication of international relations, responsibility for the global environment, and the diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance (Duchêne, 1973: 20) . These are 'milieu goals' rather than 'possession goals', according to Arnold Wolfers' (1962: 73-76) distinction. Possession goals further the national interest. Milieu goals aim to shape the environment in which the state operates. Milieu goals may only be means of achieving possession goals, but they may also be goals that transcend the national interest and are shared widely. In other words a sense of 'global responsibility' (Schoeman, 2003: 351) is present in the case of a middle power.
In the Brasilia Summit Declaration (BSD) Singh, da Silva, and Mbeki reaffirmed their commitment to the promotion of peace, security, human rights, and sustainable social and eco- In fact Brazil and South Africa have common standpoints regarding non-proliferation and disarmament after renouncing their respective nuclear weapons programs. South Africa was instrumental in brokering an agreement between the so-called 'minimalist' and 'maximalist' groupings during the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995. Pretoria succeeded in getting the conference to adopt an indefinite extension of the NPT, and tightened a set of ob-jectives and principles (non-binding) on non-proliferation and disarmament. Quite the contrary the non-NPT-signatory state India decided to 'go nuclear'. This places India and the other two IBSA countries at opposite sites of the nuclear divide (Sahni, 2006: 102 Critical commentators have viewed middle powers as little more than status-seekers: they are powers that do not qualify for a place in the ranks of the great powers, but that are unwilling to be classified with the ʹmediocre restʹ, and seek alternative roles to exercise leadership. Thus, Touval and Zartman (1985: 252-253) note that mediation by the medium-sized states appears to often have been motivated by the desire to enhance their influence and prestige. There should be little wonder that small and medium-sized states seek to enhance their international standing by assuming the role of mediators -they have few other options to do so. Moreover, mediating often saves them from having to take sides when pressed to do so in a conflict. Examples for South African mediation efforts can be found in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1999) and in Burundi (2000) . Brazil offered its diplomatic services 7 Argentina-Brazil nuclear negotiations initiated in the mid-eighties led to a cumulative process of non-proliferation negotiations nowadays considered an archetype for nuclear weapon free zones. In November 1990 both countries signed the Quadripartite Agreement together with the IAEA and ABACC (Agencia Brasileño Argentina de Contabilidad y Control). Today Brazil and Argentina form the centre of gravity of Southern Latin America's security community (Flemes, 2006a) .
in the Columbian civil war and acted as a mediator in Bolivian crises twice (2003 and 2005) .
These mediation efforts certainly reflect more than the pursuit of milieu goals. Brasilia and Pretoria must be interested in avoiding the extension of national crises as democratic stability is a precondition for the economic development of their regions. The largest economies of Africa and Latin America need stable environments for trade and investment to secure the possession goal of economic growth.
Middle powers by themselves are unlikely to have overwhelming influence on the international stage. As such, middle power leadership is multilateralist in approach, and tries to build consensus around issues such as non-proliferation or environmental degradation.
'Niche diplomacy' (Cooper, 1997) When it comes to the reform of the United Nations, the IBSA governments argue that its Security Council (UNSC) must be expanded to include developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America to make it more democratic, legitimate, representative and responsive. In Secondly, the interests of the G-3 are not always convergent. For instance, in what regards the agricultural issue, South Africa's position is more flexible than India's, and it is willing to make concessions in exchange for the reduction of agricultural subsidies and non-tariff barriers. India presents claims and is not willing to bargain. In the area of financial services, retail trade and construction, the interests of South African companies led to a policy of closing the doors to foreign participation. In the industrial goods segment, India does not show willingness to make concessions and reduce the high tariffs practiced in specific sectors (Dupas, 2006: 334) . Despite the mentioned divergences, the interests and objectives pursued by India, Brazil and South Africa in global governance institutions, especially in the WTO, highlight that these states are much more than status seekers. Putting the emerging middle power coalition's functional leadership into the broader context of the international system, IBSA's foreign policy behavior can be seen as a countervailing force to the current hierarchy of the global order.
Soft balancing against the most powerful?
Since 2001 the United States has unilaterally abandoned the Kyoto accords of global warming, rejected a participation in the International Criminal Court, and withdrawn from the Antiballistic Missile treaty. Despite its claims to the contrary, the 'lonely superpower', as Huntington (1999) has called the United States, is not speaking on behalf of the international community, when it comes to global governance issues ranging from environmental protection to pre-emptive military interventions. On many issues, the community for which the United States speak includes, at best, its Anglo-Saxon cousins; on others we can add Israel, Japan, Germany, and some Eastern European and some Central American states. These are important states, but they fall far short of being the global community and the superpower is definitely not speaking on behalf of the developing world.
A crucial reason for US hegemony in international relations is its military supremacy. Washington accounts for 42 percent of global defense expenditure (SIPRI, 2006) and 60 percent of the world's research and development spending (BICC, 2006) . In conventional military terms the USA will remain the dominant global power for a long time: it's hard times for hard balancing based on countervailing military alliances (external balancing) and arms build-ups (internal balancing). But as Nye (2004) argues, real global unipolarity requires the domination of two additional playing fields: global economics and transnational problems such as terrorism, crime, global warming, and epidemics. While Washington is a strongbut not the single strongest -economy, transnational problems can only be resolved through cooperation of many players. Huntington uses the concept of a uni-multipolar system to describe the current structure of the international system (1999: 37). From a realist perspective a multipolar system can be the result of the emergence of regional unipolarities that build coalitions to balance the superpower (Wohlfort 1999: 30) . Linking this statement with the developing countries' lack of power in the international system multipolarisation must become a priority foreign policy objective of developing states, as unbalanced power will permit the powerful to 'lay down the law' to the less powerful and skew the terms of cooperation in its own favor (Hurrell, 2005: 16) . In particular the governments of Southern countries that have the capacity to build regional unipolarities must be interested in finding an effective way to challenge the current international hierarchy and to transform themselves into the power poles of a future multipolar system.
The foreign policy options of the states under consideration are very limited in view of the overwhelming hard power of the hegemon. Although India, Brazil, and South Africa enjoy increasing influence, they are still located in the periphery of the current world system, command relatively modest material resources, and depend in many ways on Washington's public goods.
Soft balancing does not directly challenge US military preponderance, but uses non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine the superpower's unilateral policies (Pape, 2005: 10) .
Soft balancing involves institutional strategies such as the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially at the level of the United Nations, to constrain US power (Paul, 2005: 58) . It also consists of strengthening economic ties between middle powers through sector collaboration. This will possibly shift the balance of economic power against Washington in the long term. Questioning the legitimacy of unilateral policies will increase the costs of using unilateral power by reducing the number of countries likely to cooperate with future US military interventions. Paul (2005: 59) defines three preconditions for soft balancing behavior:
'(1) The hegemon's power position and military behavior are of growing concern but
do not yet pose a serious challenge to the sovereignty of second-tier powers; (2) the dominant state is a major source of public goods in both the economic and security areas that cannot simply be replaced; and (3) 
Institutional foreign policy instruments
Institutional instruments are applied indirectly to influence the behavior of states by means of formal and informal procedures and rules. Neo-realists (see Waltz, 1981; Mearsheimer, 1990) consider international institutions to be merely puppets of the super and great powers with marginally regulatory effects on the behavior of the state actors:
'International institutions are created by the more powerful states, and the institutions survive in their original form as long as they serve the major interests of their creators, or are thought to do so' (Waltz, 2000: 26) .
Even neo-liberal institutionalism (see Keohane, 1988 and 1989) The different degree of economic internationalization of India, Brazil and South Africa can constrain bi-and trilateral trade relations between them. India is less integrated into the global economy than South Africa and Brazil. Its internationalization occurs in a more controlled manner, and some strategic commercial activities are preserved for the domestic capital (Mallavarapu, 2006) . South Africa, on its turn, is one of the most open economies in the world (White, 2006) , and seems to follow the economic opening pattern implemented in Mecosur states including Brazil.
Due to its comparatively small and liberalized economy South Africa finds itself in a situation of deficit regarding its trade balance with India and Brazil. A study carried out by a South African think tank on the potential impact of free trade arrangements with India and Brazil (Stern and Stevens, 2000) found that the benefits for the South African economy would be 'relatively modest' when compared to other regional opportunities. It singled out the difficulties in negotiating tariff reductions to protected industries in India. Dupas (2006: 334) argues similarly that the South African and Indian economies are little complementary.
Nevertheless, Pretoria negotiates preferential trade agreements with Delhi and Brasilia. In the long term the preferential access to these big economies aims at technology, knowledge and energy transfers. Many barriers such as distance, language, shipping costs and non-availability of a direct airlink, complicate the commercial ties between Brazil and India 11 . Additionally, the Brazilian business community has expressed strong reservations about any serious shift in economic priorities away from its traditional markets (Alden and Veira, 2005: 1092) . Nevertheless trade between Brazil and India has more than doubled between 2001 and 2005 to US$ 2,3 billion and it seems to grow rapidly (Chatterjee and Dhoot, 2006: 25) . Delhi followed (WTO, 2005: 148) . Indian decision makers see the strengthening of commercial ties with Brazil not at least as a bridge to the great US market. Indeed, economic coop-9 South African companies have invested in India in diamond mines and jewellery production, alcoholic beverages and financial services. Indian companies have invested in automobiles, information technology, alcoholic beverages, pharmaceuticals, infrastructure, insurance, and hotels. 10 Currently, three quarters of South African exports to Brazil consist of mineral products, chemicals and base metals and its imports from Brazil largely consist of machinery, vehicles, vehicle components and chemicals as well. 11 Brazilian enterprises invest in India's construction, infrastructure and energy sector. On the other hand, the Brazilian government has invited Indian companies to invest in fields such as agribusiness, information technology and automobiles.
eration among India, Brazil and South Africa is hampered by the fact that they produce similar products and compete for access to the OCDE markets.
Given the geographical distances, strengthening transport links is an important issue for exploiting the full potential of trade and investments. At the Brasilia Summit, a Maritime
Transportation Agreement was concluded to improve logistics and maritime skill bases. The
Trilateral Working Group on Transportation is currently preparing a MOU on civil aviation in order to establish regular air links between the three countries. Already in 2004 cooperation treaties between the national airlines were signed to simplify the goods-and passenger traffic.
The transportation sector presents opportunities for exchanging best practices as well. 12
The energy sector is another pivotal area of cooperation that was spelled out at the Septem- the NSG to be given access to international technology for a civilian nuclear energy program 12 India's expertise in the automation of railways can be extended to South Africa and Brazil. Similarly, India and South Africa can learn from the Brazilian experiences in the introduction of private capital to improve railway efficiency. India, with its renowned maritime training institutes, can offer modern maritime training to seafarers of South Africa and Brazil. Moreover, South Africa's experiences in port management can be extended to the Indian port authorities (Kumar, 2006: 19) . 13 India's capabilities in the field of solar photovoltaic could be of considerable interest to Brazil and South Africa given the climate and vastness of these countries. South Africa has a highly developed synthetic fuels industry. This industry takes advantage of the countryʹs abundant coal resources and has developed an expertise in the technology of coal liquefaction. In view of high oil prices, this technology may be commercially viable and could be explored by Indian companies.
(Business Day, 3 October 2006) . Supporting the deal between the US and India, which has not signed the NPT, indicates a major shift from a rule and principle based to a more pragmatic proliferation policy of Pretoria. The three emerging Southern powers seem therefore determined to seek large-scale synergies in nuclear energy production.
Findings and perspectives
Contrary to Cox (1996: 245) , at least at the rhetorical level the emerging middle powers under consideration seek to impose an ideologically preconceived vision of an ideal world order. It consists of the civilian ends or milieu goals of foreign policy, defined as the domestication of international relations and the diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance.
IBSA's functional leadership in WTO negotiations and the reform debate of the United Na- In sum, the convergent interests with regard to the multilateral reform project at the global level are much more obvious than the expected synergies of sector cooperation, particularly in trade. But if we define sector cooperation as a mechanism to cement the broader strategy of soft balancing the short term profits of common trade are not a pivotal criterion for the success of IBSA. Their conversion from rule takers into rule makers of the international system will depend on four variables:
Firstly, IBSA's success will depend on its ability to focus on distinct areas of cooperation and avoid -or postpone -those areas of controversy that tend to hold up the cooperation process. Secondly, the three states must consolidate their common strategy by mutually verifying their willingness of collective action. Although some authors criticized IBSA's lack of a clear strategy (Alden and Vieira, 2005: 1088) a strategy of soft balancing using institutional instruments of interest-assertion in order to achieve common milieu goals has been identified here. Thirdly, it is more appropriate to stress a lack of institutionalization than of strategy.
IBSA is not a formal organization and it has no headquarter or secretariat. The potential constraints of a G-5 initiative are, however, similar to the existing limits of cooperation between the IBSA states. Firstly, the priority of the European integration process and the connected problem of major powers in the EU and East Asia that would try to undermine a G-5 must be taken into consideration. Secondly, Germany and Japan maintain historically rooted transatlantic respectively transpacific relations as one of the central pillars of their foreign policies, especially in security affairs. Thirdly, many divergent interests in WTO negotiations such as the agricultural subsidies issue have to be resolved before forming a sustainable diplomatic alliance. Fourthly, the complementarity of the economies of a G-5 and the potential synergies of sector collaboration must be the subject of future quantitative research projects. At the first glance a mix of the different market structures of industrialized and developing economies could create profitable collaboration opportunities. However, in the current constellation IBSA's role might be limited to the one of a veto player in the WTO negotiations without a major systemic impact at the global level.
